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[2019] Criminal Law Review 656-683 
Private prosecution: a useful constitutional safeguard or potentially dangerous 
historical anomaly? 
Claire de Than 
Jesse Elvin 
In the light of recent English cases concerning the right of individuals to bring private 
prosecutions, this article argues that this right should be removed or circumscribed more 
closely. In particular, we advocate three reforms here if the power to launch private 
prosecutions is to remain. 
 
Introduction  
In the light of recent English cases concerning the right of individuals to bring private 
prosecutions, this article argues that this right1 should be removed or circumscribed more 
closely. In particular, we advocate three reforms here if the power to launch private 
prosecutions is to remain. First, we assert that there is a general need for an initial pre-trial 
hearing to act as a filtering mechanism in relation to private prosecutions. Second, we maintain 
that legislation should fix the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) duty in relation to private 
prosecutions in a clear, specific manner, and should apply both at the initial filter stage and 
throughout any subsequent proceedings which began as an attempted private prosecution. 
Third, we argue that there should be clear sanctions where a defendant has been subjected to a 
malicious private prosecution or to behaviour by a private prosecutor or their agents which 
breaches the normal requirements of the laws of criminal procedure and evidence.  
                                                            
1 Although it might be queried whether “right” is the correct label; “residual ability” might be more accurate, as 
we shall see. If it is a right, it is a limited one, and might more accurately be described as a right to commence 
criminal proceedings for most offences. 
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Our aim is to advance significantly the theory and analysis in an under-explored but important 
area of law.2 We will examine two contemporary cases in particular. In the first, R. (on the 
application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS,3 the Supreme Court determined that it is lawful for the CPS 
to take over and discontinue private prosecutions unless the evidence is “more likely to result 
in a conviction than not to do so”4; that is, unless there is a “realistic prospect” of a conviction. 
However, Gujra is also important because it was the first time that the Supreme Court 
considered the merits of the right to bring a private prosecution: Lord Wilson stated that there 
is “much to be said”5 in favour of Lord Mance’s view that this right is a valuable “safeguard 
against wrongful refusal or failure by public prosecuting authorities to institute proceedings”.6 
Lord Wilson endorsed that.7 We will argue that the counter-arguments are at least equally 
strong, especially since there are other ways of challenging a refusal to prosecute. Furthermore, 
we will argue that the majority of the Supreme Court took the wrong approach in Gujra when 
deciding that it is appropriate for the CPS to use “a simple ‘better than evens’ or ‘is a conviction 
more likely than not?’ test”.8  
 
The second contemporary case was decided in the Crown Court, where a defendant was 
convicted of conspiracy to defraud after a private prosecution mounted against him by the 
Federation Against Copyright Theft (FACT).9 We will argue that this second case is significant 
                                                            
2 The Law Reform Commission of Canada observed in 1986 that there has been very little written about private 
prosecutions (Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No 52: Private Prosecutions (1986), p.2). 
This is still true today. 
3 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
4 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [1] per Lord Wilson; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
5 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [29]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
6 Jones v Whalley [2006] UKHL 41 at [43]; [2007] Crim. L.R. 74. 
7 Jones v Whalley [2006] UKHL 41 at [29]; [2007] Crim. L.R. 74. 
8 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [126], per Lady Hale; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337, 
arguing in the minority against the adoption of such a test. 
9 Vickerman Indictment No. T2009 7188, unreported Newcastle Upon Tyne Crown Court 2012. 
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in providing a clear illustration of the dangers of private prosecutions: specifically, it raises 
serious concerns about the potential abuse of state power and resources by private 
organisations. 
 
It is necessary briefly to define our scope at the outset. A private prosecution is “a prosecution 
started by a private individual, or entity who/which is not acting on behalf of the police or other 
prosecuting authority”.10 Although the CPS brings most prosecutions in England and Wales,11 
there is still a power to initiate a private prosecution, subject to certain controls.12 Many would 
be surprised to learn that they may number in the thousands per year: indeed, Lord Thomas CJ 
recently observed:  
 
“there is an increase in private prosecutions at a time of retrenchment of state activity in many 
areas where the state had previously provided sufficient funds to enable state bodies to conduct 
such prosecutions.”13  
 
Private prosecutions and theories about criminal justice  
This article is not seeking to provide a comprehensive analysis of theoretical models through 
which the power to initiate a private prosecution can be examined. Such theories do, however, 
form a framework to understand the issues raised by this power more effectively. Whether 
                                                            
10 CPS website, “Private Prosecutions”, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions [Accessed 10 
June 2019]. 
11 The CPS was created by s.1 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. Prior to this Act, individual police forces 
prosecuted most offences. 
12 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 s.6(1). 
13 R. (on the application of Virgin Media Ltd) v Zinga (Munaf Ahmed) [2014] EWCA Crim 52; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 
2228 at [10]. The Private Prosecutors’ Association is among those arguing that further growth in private prosecu-
tions is likely due to budget restraints on enforcement agencies and the police: see Private Prosecutors’ Associa-
tion, “About Us”, http://private-prosecutions.com/about/ [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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there is justification for the existence of private prosecution in its current form must be 
considered with reference to the function of criminal punishment. This is an area where there 
is, predictably, disagreement, since criminal punishment can serve more than one purpose. As 
one commentator summarises the possibilities, punishment may be a deterrent, “but when 
deterrence fails, a court may impose punishment to incapacitate the offender, to rehabilitate the 
offender, or to exist as an end in itself”.14 It might be thought that it is not significant who 
conducts the prosecution if the goal is deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and/or an end 
in itself (just deserts). However, as we shall show below when considering arguments for and 
against private prosecutions, this matter is not so straightforward. 
 
Who is the victim? 
When considering the appropriate nature of the prosecution system, it is helpful to consider 
both the history of views about the nature of crime and contemporary models of criminal 
process. First, crime can be viewed as a harm against the individual or against the State. 
Historically, the former view dominated; “hence crimes were prosecuted in much the same 
way as suits in tort were litigated: individuals squared off in a state-provided forum”.15 The 
State simply provided a mechanism by which a criminal could be made to pay restitution and 
the victim could obtain “private vengeance”.16 Gradually, the second view gained prominence. 
This change in theoretical understanding of crime has practical consequences: “[i]f crime is 
viewed as harm principally against the victim, then the state has no (or only a minor) role in 
                                                            
14 M. O’Neill, “Private Vengeance and the Public Good” (2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Con-
stitutional Law 659, 663. 
15 O’Neill, “Private Vengeance and the Public Good” (2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 664. However, O’Neill acknowledges that “crimes could be seen as offenses against the organization 
of the Church [and God] as well”. 
16 Sir J. Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: MacMillan, 1883), p.245. 
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seeking remediation”.17 On the other hand, if crime is viewed as a harm principally against the 
State, then it follows that the individual should have little or no role in initiating and conducting 
prosecution. O’Neill speculates that the change contributed to a decline in private 
prosecutions,18 yet they appear to have had a resurgence recently. Is this resurgence simply an 
ad hoc response to retrenchment in terms of police and CPS activity or is it possible to view it 
more positively through the lens of a victims’ rights model of criminal justice? 
 
Models of criminal justice 
In 1964, Herbert Packer published an influential article outlining two models of criminal 
justice, the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model. Although these models are useful 
because they can serve as normative guides and allow trends in criminal justice to be 
highlighted,19 they have been the subject of convincing criticism and are not the only possible 
models of criminal justice.20 Both models assume that the State, rather than the individual, 
controls the investigation and prosecution of crime. Packer claimed that the models capture 
“the spectrum of choices that is at least in theory open in fixing the shape of the criminal 
process”,21 yet neither takes account of the existence of private prosecutions. Nor do they 
recognise that individuals may play other roles in the criminal justice process, as is evidenced 
by the surprisingly high percentage of convictions for sexual grooming of a child which result 
from evidence provided by “vigilante paedophile hunters” 22  who may have initiated the 
                                                            
17 O’Neill, “Private Vengeance and the Public Good” (2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 659, 663. 
18 O’Neill, “Private Vengeance and the Public Good” (2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 670. 
19 See K. Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
671. 
20 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 674. 
21 H. Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process” (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1, 2. 
22 44 per cent of trials for such offences in 2016, according to a Freedom of Information Act request from the 
BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-41203273 [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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conduct which led to the offence. The Crime Control model resembles an assembly line, 
focussing upon efficiency in the criminal process.23 For this purpose, efficiency means “the 
system’s capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high proportion of criminal 
offenders whose offenses become known”.24 In contrast, the Due Process model “looks very 
much like an obstacle course”25 where reliability is not sacrificed to efficiency and the aim is 
“… at least as much to protect the factually innocent as it is to convict the factually guilty”.26 
Under this model, the notion of equality demands a “public obligation to ensure that financial 
inability does not destroy the capacity of an accused to assert what may be meritorious 
challenges to the processes being invoked against him”.27 Kent Roach has pointed out that 
“[a]lthough Packer’s models have had remarkable durability, they are a product of the time and 
place in which they were conceived”.28 One problem is that they assume that the criminal 
justice system inevitably involves the State asserting its power against the individual through 
the use of punishment. In response, Roach has proposed two new, additional models of criminal 
justice:  
 
“a punitive model of victims’ rights which relies upon the criminal sanction and punishment, 
and a non-punitive model of victims’ rights which stresses crime prevention and restorative 
justice.”29  
                                                            
23 Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process” (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 
10. 
24 Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process” (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 
10. 
25 Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process” (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 
13. 
26 Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process” (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 
15. 
27 Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process” (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 
19. 
28 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 682. 
29 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 699. 
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Like Packer, he does not believe that any legal system will perfectly reflect any one model.30  
 
The punitive model of victims’ rights outlined by Roach pits the rights of victims and potential 
victims against the accused’s due process rights,31 and clearly views crime as a harm at least 
partially perpetrated against the individual, as opposed to the State. Hence victims and their 
representatives play a much more active role than under the Crime Control and Due Process 
models, jump-starting legal change, paying much less deference to authority figures and 
subjecting them to critical scrutiny.32 It might seem that private prosecution fits within this 
punitive model of victims’ rights as part of a wider attempt to take victims’ rights seriously. 
However, this is not the case, since Roach asserts that  
 
“[i]n a punitive victims’ rights approach … [victims] can only make representations to 
legislators, judges, and administrators who retain the ultimate power to impose punishment.”33  
 
Hence it excludes both private prosecutions and vigilante evidence-production. 
 
According to Roach, the non-punitive model of victims’ rights is different in that it focuses on 
the prevention of crime and restorative justice.34 Under this model, crime prevention can occur 
through methods such as private policing or neighbourhood watch schemes and legitimate non-
punitive responses to crime can include “avoidance, shaming, apologies, and informal 
                                                            
30 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 713. 
31 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 700. 
32 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 701. 
33 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 710. 
34 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 706–
707. 
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restitution”.35 This model not only aims to reduce suffering of both victims and offenders,36 
but posits that the key players in the justice system should be “the victim, the offender, and 
their families and supporters- not police, prosecutors, defense lawyers or judges who may 
appropriate their dispute”.37  
 
Roach’s additional models of criminal justice are useful since they capture a wider range of 
options or values, but there are yet more: for instance, Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne 
advocate a rights perspective, stating that respect for rights is “an objective to be obtained 
whilst the criminal justice system pursues retributive justice”38 and drawing partially upon the 
European Convention on Human Rights for their normative framework.39 Another framework 
in contrast focuses upon protecting and enhancing freedom, since that is the point of the 
criminal justice system.40  
 
It is clearly feasible for victims and their representatives to do more than make representations 
to legal officials when seeking punishment, since private parties can, and do sometimes, act as 
prosecutors. Nevertheless, none of the above models of criminal justice requires the existence 
of private prosecutions as an element of justice.41 Rather, they may divert resources which 
would otherwise be available to ensure justice for all. As we shall demonstrate below, there is 
no justification for the role of private prosecution in its current form. 
                                                            
35 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 707. 
36 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 707. 
37 Roach, “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671, 710. 
38 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.48. 
39 Ashworth and Redmayne, The Criminal Process (2010), p.48. 
40 A. Sanders, R. Young and M. Burton, Criminal Justice, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.48. 
41 Indeed, Ashworth and Redmayne conclude that as a matter of principle “there are no convincing arguments for 
accepting that victims or victims’ families have a right to influence any of the key decisions in the criminal pro-
cess” (Ashworth and Redmayne, The Criminal Process (2010), p.53). 
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 The contemporary use of the power to initiate a private prosecution  
In order to understand the scale and nature of the problems arising from private prosecutions, 
it is first necessary to understand how the power to initiate them is currently utilised. The 
creation of police forces and State prosecutors has led to it being rare for ordinary members of 
the public to bring private prosecutions.42 However, this does not mean that the ability to 
instigate a private prosecution is insignificant from a practical perspective. First, organisations 
attempt to use private prosecutions to protect or promote their interests or goals; for instance, 
in relation to intellectual property. Bodies such as the British Phonographic Industry and FACT 
often prosecute. 43  FACT describes itself as being at “the forefront of the fight against 
intellectual property crime in the UK and internationally, specialising in protecting both 
physical and digital content”44 and regularly instigates private prosecutions for offences such 
as conspiracy to defraud. Such organisations are in some ways acting similarly to the 
“associations for the prosecution of felons” which proliferated in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, before the creation of modern-style police forces.45 It is unclear how many private 
prosecutions FACT instigates each year, since there are no official statistics on this matter. 
However, it is worth noting that FACT “represents and protects the intellectual property rights 
of a wide range of global brands and businesses”,46 and that one of them, Sky UK Ltd, claimed 
in 2014 that FACT had recently mounted prosecuted over 1,500 successful prosecutions on 
                                                            
42 As stated by Lord Diplock in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435 at 498; [1977] 3 W.L.R. 
300. 
43 R. Crozier, “Criminal Prosecutions – An Underused Remedy” [April 2012] Intellectual Property Magazine 31. 
44 FACT, “About FACT”, http://www.fact-uk.org.uk/about/ [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
45 On these historical associations, see J. Langbein, “The Prosecutorial Origins of Defence Counsel in the Eight-
eenth Century: the Appearance of Solicitors” [1999] CLJ 314, 342–347. 
46 FACT, “Our customers”, https://www.fact-uk.org.uk/about-us/our-customers/ [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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their behalf alone.47  
 
These figures suggest that FACT is a prolific prosecutor.48 It must be remembered that not all 
criminal prosecutions result in convictions, and that there must therefore have been many more 
private prosecutions commenced in relation to Sky programming than the number of 
convictions. Again, it must be remembered that FACT has conducted private prosecutions on 
behalf of many organisations, not just those relating to televised sport. Moreover, various other 
companies have also instigated numerous private prosecutions in recent years: for instance, a 
company named Media Protection Services brought dozens of private prosecutions on behalf 
of the Football Association Premier League between 2005 and 2011,49 and the UK Film 
Distributors’ Association (FDA) launched the Film Content Protection Agency in 2016 to take 
over anti-film piracy work previously undertaken by FACT.50 Perhaps most importantly of all, 
it must be acknowledged that private prosecutions are brought by a wide range of organisations, 
including charitable and public interest bodies51 as well as commercial ones, and that the threat 
of private prosecution itself may have a significant deterrent function.52 For instance, 696 
defendants were convicted in 2017 as a result of prosecutions brought by the Royal Society for 
                                                            
47 British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (now trading as Sky UK Ltd), “Fighting Fraud”, http://business.sky.com/Custom-
erZone/FightingFraud/ [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
48 In 2016, the Motion Picture Association withdrew its funding of FACT, reportedly reducing FACT’s total 
budget by 50 per cent (see T. Grater, “FACT Faces uncertain future following MPA funding pull”, 
http://www.screendaily.com/news/fact-faces-uncertain-future-following-mpa-funding-pull/5104276.article [Ac-
cessed 10 June 2019]). However, this has not necessarily reduced its activity in terms of private prosecution, with 
its focus reportedly shifting to “games, music and leisure” and “smaller audiovisual producers” (A. Orlowski, 
“Copyright crimefighters FACT change tack after Hollywood calls The Terminator”, The Register, 9 November 
2016). 
49 See C. Binham, “Premier League Prosecutions in Doubt”, The Financial Times, 16 August 2012; these prose-
cutions are now undertaken in partnership with FACT. 
50  FDA, “Film Content Protection Agency”, http://www.launchingfilms.com/filmcontentprotection-
agency/howfcpaworks [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
51 See L. Leigh, “Private Prosecutions and Diversionary Justice” [2007] Crim. L.R. 289, 293–294. 
52 As we shall see, there are also significant issues in relation to the investigation and process of private prosecu-
tions. 
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the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA).53 Concern has also recently been raised about 
the use of private prosecutions by companies working for rail operators: regarding the offence 
of boarding a train without a valid ticket, John Spencer has argued that honest travellers are 
privately prosecuted but dishonest travellers are not, since the latter pay civil penalty fares but 
the former protest.54  
 
The second mode of use of private prosecutions is by ordinary members of the public, as 
distinct from organisations. Some law firms and private investigators now encourage 
individuals and corporations to bring private prosecutions as a means of obtaining redress when 
police are allegedly not interested55: indeed, there are now at least two English law firms that 
specialise in private prosecutions,56 and the launch of the Private Prosecutors’ Association in 
2017 would appear to indicate further growth, or intention to support growth.57 This kind of 
encouragement has the potential to increase significantly the number of private prosecutions 
brought by ordinary members of the public. Those providing such encouragement do not 
necessarily highlight the risks or disadvantages of bringing a private prosecution, or the relative 
                                                            
53 RSPCA, Prosecutions Annual Report 2017, p.32. The RSPCA made changes to its private prosecution strategy 
as a result of a 2013 report it commissioned (see “RSPCA Response to the Wooler Review”, 
https://www.rspca.org.uk/webContent/staticImages/Downloads/RSPCAResponseToWoolerReview.pdf [Ac-
cessed 10 June 2019]. However, concerns about its role as a private prosecutor (House of Commons Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Animal Welfare in England: Domestic Pets (London: TSO, 2016), HC Paper 
No. 117, p.30) led to the Government putting the RSPCA on “probation” for the following two years (see C. 
Hope, “Ministers put RSPCA on ‘probation’ for two years over prosecution policy” The Telegraph, 12 February 
2017). More recently, the RSPCA sought new powers to search private property to help it seize animals in distress 
(see BBC, “RSPCA seeking new powers to seize ‘suffering’ animals”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
40542246 [Accessed 10 June 2019]. If granted, these new powers could lead to even more private prosecutions 
by this organisation. 
54 J.R. Spencer, “Professional Private Prosecutors and Trouble on the Trains” [2018] Archbold Review 4. 
55 Leigh, “Private Prosecutions and Diversionary Justice” [2007] Crim. L.R. 294 
56 See Edmonds, Marshall, McMahon, http://www.emmlegal.com/ [Accessed 10 June 2019] and the Private Pros-
ecution Service, “About PPS”, http://privateprosecutionservice.co.uk/about-private-prosecution-service-solici-
tors-barristers [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
57 See Private Prosecutors’ Association, http://private-prosecutions.com [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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merits of any other options available to those seeking redress for an injustice.58  
 
Even if there should be no increase in the number of private prosecutions initiated by ordinary 
members of the public, the ability to initiate such proceedings would matter from a practical 
perspective simply because of its use by commercial and other organisations. There are again 
no official statistics on the proportion of private prosecutions brought by ordinary members of 
the public, as opposed to commercial or other organisations; in fact, there are no official 
statistics at all on the prevalence of private prosecutions in England and Wales.59 However, 
figures from 1980 show that under 3 per cent of private prosecutions were brought by 
individuals, and about 9 per cent by retailers.60 From the available evidence, it seems likely 
that most private prosecutions are still instigated by organisations; for example, because they 
are more likely than individuals are to have the resources to conduct the necessary private 
investigations and legal proceedings.61  
 
 Arguments in favour of retaining private prosecution  
 
Safeguard 
                                                            
58 See, e.g. Wilsons Solicitors, “Private Prosecutions”, http://www.lawoffice.co.uk/privpros.aspx [Accessed 10 
June 2019]. 
59  See https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/24132/response/68828/attach/html/2/First%20re-
sponse.doc.html [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
60 D. Hay, “Controlling the English Prosecutor” (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 165, 180–181, referring to 
K. Lidstone, R. Hogg and F. Sutcliffe, Prosecutions by Private Individuals and Non-Police Agencies (London: 
HMSO, 1980), Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study No. 10, pp.15–33. These statistics 
predate the creation of the CPS. The downgrading of low-value shoplifting to a summary offence by the Anti-
Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 may have reduced police enthusiasm for prosecuting shoplifters 
and so lead to a corresponding resurgence of store-led prosecutions. 
61 Crowdfunding of private prosecutions is a recent trend. It can be utilised by either organisations or individuals: 
see M. Berridge, “This week Britain’s first crowdfunded prosecution was conducted in the Old Bailey”, 
https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/insights/blogs/regulatory-blog/crowdfunding-private-prosecutions-charities-
taking-action-when-the-authorities-do-not [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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Although we believe that major reform is necessary in relation to private prosecution, there are 
arguments in favour of its retention that cannot simply be dismissed out of hand, the primary 
one being that it serves as a safeguard against “capricious, corrupt or biased failure or refusal 
of … authorities to prosecute offenders.”62 One concern here63 is that the authorities may be 
reluctant or even unwilling to prosecute members of “the establishment”, such as politicians or 
police officers.64  
 
Bookmaker’s approach 
Another concern, raised by the Police Federation, is that the CPS only pursue the “most certain 
of cases”, perhaps because of performance targets.65 Lady Hale echoed this concern about a 
“so-called ‘bookmaker’s approach’” to prosecution in her dissenting speech in Gujra 66 
suggesting that private prosecution is important as a safeguard for protecting victims of crime, 
particularly “those who have traditionally had such difficulty in getting their voices heard or, 
if heard, believed”.67 Her position here seems to reflect some kind of punitive victims’ rights 
model of criminal justice, but she clearly believes that it is necessary for victims to have more 
rights than are permissible under Roach’s punitive model described above. Her view is that 
“apparently credible complaints have not been taken further because of so-called ‘lack of 
evidence’”68 and that such cases “are likely to involve a violation of the victim’s rights under 
                                                            
62 Gouriet, v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435; [1977] 3 W.L.R. 300, per Lord Diplock. 
63 G. Williams, “The Power to Prosecute” [1955] Crim. L.R. 596, 599. 
64 See, e.g. R. Camber, “MPs WILL be privately prosecuted over expenses scandal ‘if CPS drops the ball’ thanks 
to donations from Mail readers” The Daily Mail 26 September 2009 and the crowdfunded “#BrexitJustice” pros-
ecution of Boris Johnson for misconduct in a public office, which passed the threshold test on 29 May 2019 but 
which was quashed by the High Court on 7 June 2019. For examples of private prosecution being brought against 
police officers, see “Police officers in court as man brings private prosecution” The Telegraph, 15 August 2012, 
and N. Syson, “Amateur Lawyer Cop Rap” The Sun 24 April 2017. 
65 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice 
System (London: TSO, 2009), HC 186, p.17. 
66 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [126]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
67 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [124]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
68 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [130]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
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Article 8 or, in extreme cases, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights“.69Accordingly, Lady Hale believes that an effective right to bring private prosecutions 
is necessary for the State to fulfil its “positive obligation to provide an effective deterrent [to 
private parties interfering with an individual’s human rights], in the shape of the criminal 
law”.70  
 
This view does not reflect the position of the European Court of Human Rights, which has held 
that the “threshold evidential test” used by the CPS does not violate any rights of the victims 
of crimes.71 The Court found that the CPS evidential test is not arbitrary, since (inter alia) it is 
a single standard which applies to all (public) prosecutions, is not an unduly high threshold and 
applies to all offences regardless of the identity of the alleged offender.72 But the same cannot 
be said of private prosecutions, where there is no consistently applied single threshold (unless 
the CPS take over the prosecution),73 and where the only prosecutions which take place at all 
for some offences are private. Whilst it is true that the State has a positive obligation to provide 
an effective deterrent, our opinion is that the possibility of challenging a CPS decision not to 
prosecute deals with the human rights concerns outlined by Lady Hale and has the advantage 
of being open to all victims, not just those who can afford to commence a prosecution (we 
                                                            
69 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [133]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. She cites alle-
gations of sexual offences as one such example; however, recent scandals indicate that, in at least some cases, 
public prosecutions for sex offences are taking place even when exculpatory evidence exists. The cure for such 
failures lies not in letting the public “have a go”, but rather in tightening compliance with rules of evidence. 
70 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [33]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
71 Da Silva v United Kingdom (5878/08) (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 12; 40 B.H.R.C. 159 at [266]–[276]. 
72 Da Silva v United Kingdom (5878/08) (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 12; 40 B.H.R.C. 159 at [268]. 
73 The voluntary Code of Practice planned by the newly formed Private Prosecutors’ Association may introduce 
more consistency between private prosecutors, since one of the key objectives of the Association is to “Enable 
those involved in bringing private prosecutions to identify, endorse and share best practice” (http://private-prose-
cutions.com/about [Accessed 10 June 2019]). However, it is important to note that there is no requirement for 
private prosecutors to join the Association and that it will have no sanctions. Further, their draft Code is a state-
ment of current law and some good practice principles, rather than an attempt at reform. 
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consider this point in more detail below74). Furthermore, as we shall explain, there are also 
powerful human rights arguments against private prosecution. 
 
Politics 
A third concern here is that the CPS may not prosecute certain individuals for political reasons: 
for example, as in the cases of Babar Ahmad and Syed Talha Ahsan,75 because the US wants 
to extradite them. Little weight should be attached to this concern; the number of relevant cases 
is unlikely to be high, and it is doubtful that self-selected private individuals are best placed to 
determine what is in the public interest here. 
 
Gap-filling 
Tamlyn Edmonds, a barrister who specialises in private prosecutions, states that authorities 
may not prosecute offenders who deserve punishment due to prioritisation of resources by the 
police or the CPS “in these times of austerity”.76 Seen in this way, private prosecutions might 
seem to usefully “fill in the gaps” where the authorities have to focus elsewhere because a lack 
of resources forces them to prioritise their actions on other matters. However, the costs of 
bringing such prosecutions are potentially recoverable from central funds even if a prosecution 
does not result in a conviction.77 Indeed, the relevant Practice Direction indicates that an order 
for costs  
 
                                                            
74 On the human rights significance of the possibility of challenging a CPS decision, see too J. Rogers, “A Human 
Rights Perspective on the Evidential Test for Bringing Prosecutions” [2017] Crim. L.R. 678. 
75  See BBC, “Babar Ahmad and Abu Hamza among terror suspects to be sent to US”, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17662054 [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
76 T. Edmonds, “Private Prosecutions: An Individual’s Right”, http://thejusticegap.com/2012/06/private-prosecu-
tions-an-individual%E2%80%99s-right [Accessed 30 November 2017]. This view is shared by the Private Pros-
ecutors’ Association. 
77 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 s.17. 
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“should be made save where there is good reason for not doing so, for example, where 
proceedings have been instituted or continued without good cause.” 78 
 
Thus, the State often eventually bears the financial burden of private prosecutions, which may 
well be significantly higher than in comparable public prosecutions. 79  If, as the Private 
Prosecutors’ Association asserts,80 austerity has caused cuts in public prosecutions, why should 
some well-funded people and organisations be able to press ahead in their own interests and 
recoup costs from the public purse? 
 
Expertise 
A more convincing argument in favour of private prosecutions is that an alleged victim may 
be best placed to bring a case because they have knowledge or skill lacked by the authorities.81 
There are various situations where this may be the case. O’Neill cites cyber-crime as an 
illustration: “[t]he government does not, and cannot, maintain a monopoly over the specialized 
knowledge to detect and prosecute cyber-criminals”82 since private industry’s access to well-
paid programming talent gives it the edge over the government83in terms of law enforcement 
here. Our view is that private industry could legitimately play a supportive role to the police 
                                                            
78 Practice Direction (Costs in Criminal Proceedings) [2015] EWCA Crim 1568 at [2.61]. This approach “applies 
to proceedings in respect of an indictable offence or proceedings before the High Court in respect of a summary 
offence. Regulation 14(1) of the General Regulations extends it to certain committals for sentence from a Magis-
trates’ Court”. 
79 See M. Scott, “I don’t Blame the Top QC for Bringing an Unsuccessful Private Prosecution but Should we 
Have to Pay for it?”, http://barristerblogger.com/2016/03/10/dont-blame-top-qc-bringing-unsuccesful-private-
prosecution-pay [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
80 Law Society Gazette, 10 May 2018. 
81 O’Neill, “Private Vengeance and the Public Good” (2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 659, 740. 
82 O’Neill, “Private Vengeance and the Public Good” (2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 659, 741–742. 
83 O’Neill, “Private Vengeance and the Public Good” (2010) 12 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 659, 741. 
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and the CPS (for example, by providing evidence to these authorities), but that this does not 
necessarily mean that it is appropriate for the alleged victim to control the prosecution process.  
 
Control 
A final, linked, argument in favour of private prosecutions is that they are also beneficial 
because they enable individual victims to remain in control of proceedings84 and vindicate 
“personal grievances”.85 As the Law Reform Commission of Canada has rightly stated:  
 
“It may be unwise for society to ignore this elemental facet of human personality, since 
individuals, frustrated by the law, may seek to accommodate themselves by unlawful means”.86  
 
However, victims’ rights are now incorporated into the criminal justice system in a fairer 
manner than vindication of grievances of the well-funded or popular. 
 
 Arguments against retaining private prosecution  
 
Outdated 
There is a compelling case against the retention of private prosecution in its current form. 
Critics of private prosecution may advance just as many calls to theory, logic, history, human 
rights and primal needs as its proponents. Some query whether such a right has a place in a 
modern era, where crime is often seen as an offence “against the good order of the state”87 
                                                            
84 Edmonds, “Private Prosecutions: An Individual’s Right”, http://thejusticegap.com/2012/06/private-prosecu-
tions-an-individual%E2%80%99s-right [Accessed 30 November 2017]. 
85 Anonymous, “Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction” (1955) 65 Yale 
Law Journal 209, 227. 
86 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No 52: Private Prosecutions (1986), p.20. 
87 Jones v Whalley [2006] UKHL 41 at [16], per Lord Bingham; [2007] Crim. L.R. 74. 
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rather than the individual, and private prosecution can be “exercised in a way damaging to the 
public interest”.88 While it is true that  
 
“[t]he right to bring a private prosecution was once considered to be a valuable constitutional 
safeguard…. [t]hat is however now an outdated view”.89  
 
Citizens who wish to challenge prosecutorial decisions may do so via judicial review in certain 
cases.90 More importantly, recent developments have taken this further. In Killick, the Court 
of Appeal held that victims of crime have a right to review of a CPS decision not to prosecute 
or to discontinue a case, and that this is in addition to the availability of judicial review.91 In 
response, the CPS issued a new scheme and supporting guidance (the Victims’ Right to Review 
(VRR)), with effect from June 2013.92 In addition, the EU Victims’ Rights Directive came into 
effect in November 2015, including rights to support, information and involvement in criminal 
proceedings.93 The sum effect of these developments is that only certain matters such as a 
                                                            
88 Jones v Whalley [2006] UKHL 41 at [16], per Lord Bingham; [2007] Crim. L.R. 74. 
89 Media Protection Services Ltd v Crawford [2012] EWHC 2373 (Admin) at [25], per Burnton LJ; [2013] Crim. 
L.R. 155. 
90 See e.g. R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [37], per Lord Wilson; [2013] Crim. 
L.R. 337. On the limited significance of judicial review in this context, see Rogers, “A Human Rights Perspective 
on the Evidential Test for Bringing Prosecutions” [2017] Crim. L.R. 678, 686–687. 
91 Killick (Christopher) [2011] EWCA Crim 1608 at [49]; [2012] 1 Cr. App. R. 10. 
92 See CPS, “Victims’ Right to Review Scheme”, http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_re-
view/index.html [Accessed 10 June 2019]. This scheme has significantly reduced the prospect of being able to 
challenge a decision not to prosecute by way of judicial review. In L v DPP [2013] EWHC 1752 at [11]–[12]; 
(2013) 177 J.P. 502, the High Court stated: “First, no judicial review should be brought until the CPS has had an 
opportunity of conducting a further review under their Victim right of review procedure. In the ordinary case, if 
a challenge is to be brought before that right of review has been taken up, a court should not entertain it. Second, 
if there has been a review in accordance with this procedure, then, it seems to me, that the prospect of success 
will … be very small”. 
93 The Directive gives Members States a degree of discretion to determine what is required in terms of the right 
of victims to participate in criminal proceedings. In England and Wales, victims can participate in the criminal 
justice system through the Victim Personal Statement, which a court should take into account prior to sentencing: 
see CPS, “Victim Personal Statement”, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/victim-personal-statements [Ac-
cessed 10 June 2019]. However, there is less scope for victims to participate in public prosecutions prior to the 
sentencing stages, although they can appear as witnesses and the CPS “will consider any views expressed by the 
victim or victim’s family” (see CPS, “Victims and Witnesses: Care and Treatment”, https://www.cps.gov.uk/le-
gal-guidance/victims-and-witnesses-care-and-treatment [Accessed 10 June 2019]). 
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police failure to investigate fall outside the CPS review scheme, but in some circumstances 
these matters would be within the scope of judicial review and of human rights claims, such as 
where a violation of arts 2 or 3 of the ECHR can be alleged.94 The world has moved on to such 
an extent that any need for private prosecutions must be at least very much diminished.95  
 
Three other arguments flow from this point. First, the effect of the creation of the CPS on the 
criminal justice system must be acknowledged; the CPS was created to act in the public interest 
in this context, and hence the continued existence of, and diversion of funds to, private 
prosecutions may harm the public interest. Second, a dual role as victim-prosecutor may have 
undesirable results, which have been seen in recent cases discussed below. Third, those in 
favour of private prosecutions omit to mention their impact on the rights of defendants. We 
shall look at each of these arguments in turn. 
 
CPS 
The CPS is required to take the public interest into account in pursuing its role. Its decisions 
“have an enormous impact on everyone experiencing the criminal justice system, whether 
victims, witnesses or defendants.” 96  The House of Commons Justice Committee has 
characterised the CPS as the gatekeeper of the criminal justice system:  
 
                                                            
94 As discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in D v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] UKSC 
11; [2019] A.C. 196. 
95 R. (on the application of Hayes) v Crown Prosecution Service [2018] EWHC 327; [2018] Crim. L.R. 500 un-
derlines the point that the VRR scheme is of limited assistance where a private prosecution is taken over and the 
decision is taken to offer no evidence due to lack of a realistic prospect of conviction; proceedings cannot be 
reinstituted unless the double jeopardy rule is disapplied under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and so redress under 
the VRR scheme is limited to an explanation and apology. However, we submit that all cases should be subject 
to the same criteria regarding realistic prospects of conviction. 
96 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice 
System (London: TSO, 2009), HC 186, para.1. 
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“The prosecutor is entrusted with determining on an evidential and public interest basis 
whether a person should be prosecuted and therefore whether he or she should go forward for 
a judgment before the courts”.97  
 
However, this overlooks the significance of private prosecutors, who often have an inbuilt 
conflict of interest. Private prosecutors also determine whether a person should be prosecuted, 
and do not necessarily even take the public interest into account when doing so.98 Some 
Canadian judges have been particularly sceptical about the concept of private prosecution for 
the latter reason. As Farris J stated:  
 
“[f]or individuals who are thinking only of themselves and not of society as a whole to have 
the right to institute and carry on criminal proceedings would destroy the whole fabric of the 
recognised fairness of our criminal prosecutions”.99  
 
In principle, private prosecutors must live up to the highest standards, as “Ministers of 
Justice”. 100  In practice, important procedural safeguards may be missed in private 
prosecutions. There are some antiquated laws which are not enforced by public prosecution 
authorities on the grounds that doing so would not be in the public interest; they include plank-
carrying and rug-shaking in the street, and writing on banknotes.101 Nonetheless, there is little 
                                                            
97 House of Commons Justice Committee, The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice 
System (London: TSO, 2009), HC 186, para.2. 
98 The voluntary Code of Practice drafted by the newly formed Private Prosecutors’ Association is a far weaker 
measure than the rules which bind the state authorities in relation to the conduct of prosecutions, and, as we 
previously stated, will have no sanctions. 
99 Whiteford [1947] 1 W.W.R. 903 at 906–907. 
100 R. (on the application of Haigh) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2017] EWHC 232 (Admin); [2017] 
1 Costs L.R. 175 at [36]. 
101  For illustrations, see Law Commission, “Legal Curiosities: Fact or Fable?”, https://www.law-
com.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/Legal_Oddities.pdf [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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to prevent private parties from enforcing them if they do not have a primary motive that is “so 
unrelated to the proceedings that it renders it a misuse or an abuse of the process”102; indeed, 
this is arguably what Mary Whitehouse famously did in cases such as Lemon (Denis),103 where 
the defendant was convicted for an offence that was subsequently abolished: blasphemous 
libel. Similarly, there is little to prevent a private prosecution being brought for a serious 
offence when the CPS would be more likely to prosecute D for a less serious one; for example, 
the CPS takes the view that, where wounds are concerned, s.20 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 should only be charged where they are “really serious”.104 However, a private 
prosecution could be brought in relation to a small cut if the other requirements for a conviction 
are fulfilled, the private prosecutor is not primarily acting out of an improper motive and 
thereby using the legal process to try to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed, 
and the CPS is not already pursuing proceedings in relation to the same set of facts.105  
 
Private and public prosecutions can both be stopped for abuse of process where a trial will 
“offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety”106 or “undermine public confidence in the 
criminal justice system and bring it into disrepute”. 107  However, the courts exercise the 
jurisdiction to stay proceedings “carefully and sparingly and only for very compelling 
reasons”,108 such as where D was entrapped or abducted contrary to extradition laws. The role 
                                                            
102 In re Serif Systems Ltd [1997] CLY 1373, per Auld LJ, cited with approval in R. (on the application of Dacre 
and another) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 1667 at [28]; [2009] Crim. L.R. 100. 
103 Lemon (Denis) [1979] A.C. 617; [1979] Crim. L.R. 311. This offence was abolished by the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act 2008 s.79. 
104  CPS, “Offences Against the Person, Incorporating the Charging Standard”, http://www.cps.gov.uk/le-
gal/l_to_o/offences_against_the_person/#a15 [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
105 On a case of potentially concurrent prosecutions relating to the same set of facts, see Tower Bridge Metropol-
itan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex p Chaudhry [1994] Q.B. 340; [1993] 3 W.L.R. 1154. 
106 Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, Ex p Bennett [1994] 1 A.C. 42 at 74; [1993] 3 W.L.R. 90, per Lord 
Lowry. 
107 Latif [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104, 112, per Lord Steyn; [1996] Crim. L.R. 414. They can also be stopped where D 
cannot receive a fair trial. 
108 Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, Ex p Bennett [1994] 1 A.C. 42; [1993] 3 W.L.R. 90. 
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of abuse of process in addressing private prosecutions which have been brought primarily for 
improper motives or which are being conducted in a way that is wholly inappropriate is 
significant. Nevertheless, its effect is limited109: a judge cannot suppress a prosecution merely 
because he regrets it110 or considers it disproportionate or not in the public interest.111 The 
Court of Appeal has indicated that bad faith, unlawfulness or executive misconduct would be 
among the grounds for abuse of process: thus, they include entrapment and abduction but go 
beyond these cases.112 However, the Court acknowledged that the claim is generally only 
successful in very serious examples of malpractice and unlawfulness.113  
 
The CPS was specifically created to “make the conduct of prosecution the responsibility of 
someone who is both legally qualified and is not identified with the investigative process”114 
for the purpose of “fairness”.115 Private prosecutions, without safeguards or support, might 
undermine that purpose and may be challenged on grounds of unfairness. For example, a 
powerful organisation could use the threat of private prosecution to intimidate a vulnerable 
individual, V, to transfer certain of his property rights to this organisation to try to reduce its 
likelihood of privately prosecuting him. The CPS is expected to maintain standards of 
objectivity, independence and legal expertise, the absence of which in some private 
                                                            
109 See P. Hungerford-Welch, “Abuse of Process – Does It Really Protect The Suspect’s Rights” [2017] Crim. 
L.R. 3, arguing that its effectiveness would be “increased by greater clarity on the weight to be afforded to the 
factors which determine whether something does or does not justify a stay on the ground of abuse of process, 
together with a reappraisal of the latitude given to the investigating and prosecuting authorities if they are guilty 
of misconduct”. 
110 Connelly v DPP [1964] A.C. 1254 at 1304; [1964] 2 W.L.R. 1145. 
111 W(P) [2016] EWCA Crim 745 at [38]; [2016] Crim. L.R. 844. 
112 Crawley [2014] EWCA Crim 1028 at [21]; [2014] 2 Cr. App. R. 16. 
113 Crawley [2014] EWCA Crim 1028 at [22]; [2014] 2 Cr. App. R. 16. 
114 Sir C. Philips, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (London: HMSO, 1981), Cmnd. 8092-
I, para.7.3. 
115 Philips, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (London: HMSO, 1981), Cmnd. 8092-I, 
para.7.3. 
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prosecutions may result in unfair trials for defendants or unrealistic expectations for victims.116 
Recent judicial comments have rightly favoured these aspects of the CPS mandate; for 
example, Lord Neuberger has observed in relation to decisions whether to discontinue private 
prosecutions:  
 
“[a]n objective, expert, and experienced assessment of the prospects appears to me to be 
generally more reliable than the assessment of a person who will normally be (probably 
wholly) inexperienced in the criminal justice system, and (often, as in this case) involved, 
frequently as a victim, and therefore far from dispassionate”.117  
 
The point here is not that the CPS never makes mistakes and that it can never be inappropriately 
swayed by public opinion, pressure groups or investigation by outside bodies such as 
parliamentary select committees, 118  but that, in comparison to private prosecutors, its 
independence makes it more likely to be dispassionate and less likely to act out of self-interest. 
The palpable shift in focus and rhetoric of the criminal justice system towards the rights and 
needs of victims must not overshadow its aims: “the point of the criminal justice system is to 
identify who did the wrong thing and make that individual subject to a penalty”.119 As noted 
by Robin White, “[o]ne form of prosecutor independence in the public interest is independence 
from the victim”.120  
                                                            
116 See P. Burns, “Private Prosecutions in Canada: The Law and a Proposal for Change” (1975) 21 McGill Law 
Journal 265, 293. 
117 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [69]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. See too R. 
Buxton, “The Private Prosecutor as a Minister of Justice” [2009] Crim. L.R. 427, 428. 
118 This is arguably what happened in the case of the first prosecution of female genital mutilation: see e.g. S. 
Laville, “First FGM Prosecution: How the Case Came to Court” The Guardian, 4 February 2015. 
119 R. White, giving evidence to the Committee, House of Commons Justice Committee, The Crown Prosecution 
Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice System (London: TSO, 2009), HC 186, para.80. 
120 White, giving evidence to the Committee, House of Commons Justice Committee, The Crown Prosecution 
Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice System (London: TSO, 2009), HC 186, para.80. 
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Dual role 
The victim focus that private prosecutions create is problematic. It would be naïve to think that 
those who bring private prosecutions are all aggrieved victims of crime; some seek to exploit 
the law or have other motives. Any expansion of private prosecution could  
 
“unnecessarily widen the field of prosecution of Her Majesty’s subjects to any obsessed, 
vindictive, unscrupulous, self- styled saviour. Her Majesty’s subjects are entitled to freedom 
from unwarranted prosecution.”121  
 
The case examples which follow will demonstrate procedural unfairness, human rights 
breaches and/or double standards being applied, all of which call for reform. For the relatively 
small proportion of private prosecutions which do appear to be brought by ordinary members 
of the public seeking justice, other measures might be equally or more effective, and less 
expensive. Arguably, a better solution to victims feeling that they have not had justice is to 
provide greater resources to support them; do they necessarily feel better after court, especially 
if they lose? As noted above, the human rights era has introduced other channels of redress 
against the actions of police, government and many others, and protection of victims of crime 
has become far more central to criminal justice. In any case, to allow additional channels for 
some victims of crime (the wealthy, legally aware, privately funded or corporate) adds a steeper 
gradient to the playing field rather than truly assisting the vulnerable. It could be just as much 
a human rights violation for victims of crime as that which concerned Lady Hale in Gujra. In 
this case, her Ladyship stated that the possibility of private prosecutions is important for “the 
                                                            
121 Campbell v Sumida (1964) 49 D.L.R. (2d) 263, 271, per Miller J. 
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protection of vulnerable people from all forms of neglect and abuse, whether physical or 
sexual”,122 since they have difficulty “in getting their voices heard”.123 However, there is little 
evidence of vulnerable individuals bringing successful private prosecutions in the modern era; 
rather, the vast majority seem to be brought by well-resourced, vocal organisations protecting 
their commercial interests. Further, without appropriate support, individual private prosecutors 
may equally be at risk of censure, retaliation or intimidation, as they were historically,124 and 
the process may allow resentments to fester as much as resolve them.  
 
Defendants’ rights 
Proponents of private prosecutions tend to neglect the impact of such prosecutions on the rights 
and reasonable expectations of suspects and defendants. Several of the arguments advanced in 
favour of private prosecutions share this deficit. For example, the “filling in the gaps” 
approach, which views private prosecutions as a remedy against State prioritisation of 
resources, creates wealth discrimination and does not solve the problem of lack of resources; 
where is the fairness to potential defendants in a system which effectively allows prosecution 
only by the wealthy (or the popular, if crowdfunded) for offences which will not be prosecuted 
by the State? It is true that the costs of private prosecutions are potentially recoverable from 
central funds, but those who do not have significant financial resources are unlikely to even be 
able to initiate such prosecutions. Furthermore, the vast majority of private prosecutions never 
come to the attention of the CPS125 and so for those cases, a much weaker threshold is still the 
                                                            
122 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [130]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
123 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [125]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
124 See D. Hay, “Controlling the English Prosecutor” (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 170. 
125 In June 2013, Oliver Heald, the solicitor general, reported that “since February 2011 the CPS has been referred 
55 private prosecution cases” (Hansard, HC Deb, c3W (10 June 2013)). This is a tiny minority of cases, bearing 
in mind that the RSPCA alone convicted 2,893 defendants in 2011 and 2012 combined (see RSPCA, RSPCA 
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requirement for a private prosecution to be both initiated and pursued to either acquittal or 
conviction, unless and until the CPS hears about such cases and decides to take over and 
discontinue those which do not meet their compulsory tests. 
 
The lack of filter mechanisms for private prosecutions raises serious concerns about 
defendants’ rights. It must be remembered that allegations can have serious consequences, and 
that prosecutions are a particularly serious form of allegation, since they carry the threat of 
criminal punishment and may involve distressing and invasive investigations126; for example, 
in 2014, an action which began as a private prosecution of a vulnerable woman diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder, Eleanor de Freitas, led to her suicide days before her trial was about to start.127 
Private prosecutions are not necessarily the last resort of those cheated of justice: they may be 
malicious or not based on a reasonable suspicion that D has committed a criminal offence. The 
accused have human rights too, and private prosecutions may arguably constitute a violation 
of at least some of them, at the investigatory stage or after initiation of a prosecution. The 
Supreme Court has held that:  
 
“It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which the initiation of a prosecution against a 
person reasonably suspected of committing a criminal offence could itself be a breach of that 
person’s human rights” 128 
                                                            
Prosecutions Department Annual Report 2012, p.3). The draft Code published by the Private Prosecutors’ Asso-
ciation in January 2019 would not introduce any duty to inform the CPS of the initiation of a private prosecution; 
our response to the consultation will argue that this is a missed opportunity. 
126 See e.g. the speech of Lady Hale in Crawford Adjusters v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] 
UKPC 17; [2014] A.C. 366 at [87], a case concerning the tort of malicious prosecution. 
127 See S. Laville, “Call for Prosecutors to Answer for trial of Alleged Rape Victim who Killed Herself” The 
Guardian, 6 November 2014. The CPS could also be blamed for not discontinuing this case, but this does not 
undermine our argument that there is a compelling case against the retention of private prosecution in its current 
form; this argument is not dependent upon the assumption that the CPS is flawless. 
128 SXH v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] UKSC 30 at [33]; [2017] Crim. L.R. 712. 
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 and that “[i]f the criminalisation does not amount to an unjustifiable interference with respect 
for an activity protected by Article 8, no more does a decision to prosecute for that conduct”.129 
However, the Supreme Court here was commenting on the initiation of public prosecutions 
where tests based on evidence and the public interest have been met; the Court did not hear 
arguments on whether the continuation of a flawed prosecution raised issues with arts 8 or 6. 
We submit that a private prosecution which is brought without reasonable grounds for 
suspicion, or which is continued when a public prosecutor would have discontinued it, or when 
the offence concerned is rarely prosecuted except privately, would have led to rather different 
comments from the Court. Further, the State has a positive obligation to “take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to secure the … rights [of the individual]”,130 and it is arguable that this 
requires it to take reasonable and appropriate measures to control all prosecutions: for example, 
because pre-trial detentions may interfere with both art.5, the right to liberty, and art.8.131 The 
lack of equality of arms and resources where the private prosecutor is a well-funded 
organisation using public and private investigators risks an unfair trial, which would be an 
infringement of art.6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.132  
 
In relation to art.6, it is also important to bear in mind that private prosecutions regularly follow 
private investigations, which will be conducted or at least controlled by the private prosecutor 
rather than the police and which, unlike police investigations, may be unregulated by the rules 
provided by the Code of Practice issued under Pt II of the Criminal Procedure and 
                                                            
129 SXH v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] UKSC 30 at [32]; [2017] Crim. L.R. 712. 
130 López-Ostra v Spain [1994] ECHR 46 at 51. 
131 SXH v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] UKSC 30 at [44], per Lord Kerr; [2017] Crim. L.R. 712, in the 
minority on this point. 
132 We will explore this particular aspect of recent cases in a subsequent publication. 
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Investigations Act 1996. Amongst other things, this Code requires police officers to record and 
retain all information and material which is obtained in the course of a criminal investigation 
and which may be relevant to the investigation and to “pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, 
whether these point towards or away from the suspect”.133 It is clear that it is applicable to at 
least certain private investigations, since s.67(9) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE) stipulates that those “who are charged with the duty of investigating offences or 
charging offenders” must also “have regard to any relevant provision” of it. Case law has 
treated this as including a store detective and an RSPCA Inspector,134 as well as various 
officers of state agencies.135 In Joy v Federation Against Copyright Theft, Clarke J held that 
the duty to investigate criminal offences could be any type of legal duty.136 However, this 
means the Code of Practice does not apply to all private investigations, since there will be cases 
where the private investigator was not under any type of legal duty to investigate; for example, 
an alleged victim or a vigilante paedophile-hunter.137 This is significant because this lack of a 
requirement for some private investigators to comply with this Code of Practice undermines 
the scheme of disclosure in criminal trials, mentioned below, which is dependent upon matters 
such as the recording and retention of all relevant information. Similar concerns arise in 
relation to every other aspect of a private investigation, including compliance with PACE 
requirements for interviews with suspects and witnesses, witness statements, the adverse 
                                                            
133 Ministry of Justice, Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (section 23(1)) Code of Practice (2015), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447967/code-
of-practice-approved.pdf [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
134 Bayliss (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 235; [1994] Crim. L.R. 687 and RSPCA v Eager [1995] Crim. L.R. 59 respec-
tively. 
135 E.g. those of the Serious Fraud Office (Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Saunders [1988] Crim. L.R. 
837; [1989] C.O.D. 176). 
136 Joy v Federation Against Copyright Theft [1993] Crim. L.R. 588, Independent, 16 February 1993, discussed 
with approval by the Court of Appeal in Bayliss (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 235; [1994] Crim. L.R. 687. In Joy, the 
court stated that s.67(9) would apply to an individual who was employed by FACT to investigate criminal of-
fences. 
137 This is a particularly important point, since many of the arguments in favour of retaining private prosecutions 
presume that it is individual victims who prosecute. 
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inference rules, the right to legal advice, and also to actions which may be undertaken such as 
surveillance and covert activities. 
 
Well-funded organisations prosecuting individuals 
As we have argued elsewhere,138 private prosecutions of individuals by powerful organisations 
have led to questionable convictions. The defendant in Vickerman139 was sentenced to four 
years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud. FACT prosecuted him for running a website 
which provided links to material located elsewhere on the internet. Much of this material was 
copyrighted and made available without the permission of the rights-holders. The conviction 
does not seem to be consistent with previous case law. As we have previously stated,  
 
“[i]n Rock and Overton, Mr Justice Ticehurst found that under regulation 17 of the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 there was a complete defence for any website 
which did not itself upload copyrighted material but merely acted as a ‘conduit of information’ 
by linking to other sites containing copyrighted material.”140  
 
A similar lack of attention to legal requirements may be seen in a 2013 case brought by the 
                                                            
138 C. de Than and J. Elvin, “Towards a Rational Reconstruction of the Law on Secondary Participation and In-
choate Offences: Conspiracy” in A. Reed and P. Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic, Comparative 
and International Perspectives (Routledge, 2012), pp.151–152. 
139 Vickerman Indictment No. T2009 7188, unreported Newcastle Upon Tyne Crown Court 2012. 
140 de Than and Elvin, “Towards a Rational Reconstruction of the Law on Secondary Participation and Inchoate 
Offences: Conspiracy” in Reed and Bohlander (eds), Participation in Crime: Domestic, Comparative and Inter-
national Perspectives (Routledge, 2012), pp.151–152, referring to Rock and Overton unreported 6 February 2010, 
Gloucester Crown Court. For the limits of the “mere conduit” defence in recent CJEU decisions see also Tobias 
McFadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (C-484/14) EU:C:2016:689, http://curia.europa.eu/ju-
ris/liste.jsf?num=C-484/14 [Accessed 10 June 2019] and GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Ors 
(C_160/15) EU:C:2016:644, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-160/15 [Accessed 10 June 2019]. The 
current law is rather complex, but profit-making websites have a duty to check the legality of content to which 
they link and private users do not; it remains unclear what the precise rules are for defining “profit-making” and 
“private”. 
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RSPCA, who were accused of hiding evidence, behaving unlawfully and provoking a hate 
campaign against a family.141 The RSPCA instigated a cat, Claude, being put to sleep against 
the wishes of its owners, who were “threatened with prison and fines if they refused to sign the 
release form” 142  then prosecuted for alleged ill-treatment of the cat. Although the CPS 
eventually discontinued this prosecution143 and the RSPCA subsequently publicly apologised 
to the family concerned,144 this does not undo the harm caused by the private prosecution itself 
and the way in which the power to initiate one was abused. The worst of this oppressive conduct 
arguably happened before the institution of the private prosecution itself and it might be argued 
that, as an isolated example, this treatment was minor in comparison to matters that routinely 
happen just before a publicly brought prosecution, such as dawn raids by the police, suspects 
spending time in detention while being questioned, and so on. However, this does not 
undermine our point here that this case illustrates that there are serious dangers associated with 
private prosecution. It was the threat of private prosecution that forced the family to sign the 
release form, and it is clear that the prosecution itself caused great distress.145 The safeguards 
which apply to the investigation and conduct of public prosecutions are not mirrored in their 
private counterparts. Moreover, the extent to which this case was part of a pattern is a matter 
of debate. In another case in which the RSPCA inappropriately prosecuted a 16-year-old for 
allegedly mistreating puppies, the defendant was acquitted and the judge made it clear that the 
proceedings should never have been brought since she “clearly had very little involvement with 
                                                            
141 D. Kennedy, “Secret Report Shows RSPCA’s Cruel Dishonesty” The Times 28 March 2016. 
142 J. Crone, “RSPCA Forced to Apologise for Wrongly Putting Down Cat Belonging to Family it Accused of 
Cruelty in Bungled Prosecution” The Daily Mail, 6 November 2014). 
143 We discuss this CPS power to discontinue private prosecutions below. 
144 See Crone, “RSPCA Forced to Apologise for Wrongly Putting Down Cat Belonging to Family it Accused of 
Cruelty in Bungled Prosecution” The Daily Mail, 6 November 2014. 
145 J. Curtis, “RSPCA killed a cat for having LONG HAIR - then tried to Prosecute its Owners for Cruelty” The 
Daily Mail, 28 March 2016. 
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these animals and was not responsible for them”.146 However, this did not undo the harm that 
had been caused in the meantime.147  
 
Profit-making companies acting on behalf of railway companies have also been criticised for 
bringing, or threatening to bring, inappropriate private prosecutions for serious offences.148 
Spencer has discussed one such case at length. A Cambridge student who lost her ticket was 
subsequently threatened with prosecution for travelling without a valid ticket “with intent to 
avoid payment” contrary to s.5(3) of the Regulation of Railways Act 1889, despite offering to 
pay for a new ticket when challenged by a ticket inspector and subsequently providing 
conclusive proof of purchase.149 She eventually reluctantly settled the matter out of court by 
paying nearly ten times the price of the lost ticket.150 As Spencer says, this case raises serious 
concerns:  
 
“by repeated accusations of dishonesty which they had evidence were false, and threats to 
prosecute for an offence of which they had evidence of innocence, they induced a person to 
pay them a sum of money.”151  
 
The abuse of procedure doctrine was of limited utility, since it was not clear that it would apply 
in the student’s favour. Furthermore, “there is reason to believe that this sort of thing is not 
exceptional when train companies outsource their ‘fare evasion’ issues to private 
                                                            
146 Quoted by A. Gilligan, “The RSPCA Made US feel like Criminals” The Telegraph, 29 June 2013. 
147 Gilligan, “The RSPCA Made US feel like Criminals” The Telegraph, 29 June 2013. 
148 Spencer, “Professional Private Prosecutors and Trouble on the Trains” [2018] Archbold Review 4. 
149 Spencer, “Professional Private Prosecutors and Trouble on the Trains” [2018] Archbold Review 5. 
150 Spencer, “Professional Private Prosecutors and Trouble on the Trains” [2018] Archbold Review 5. 
151 Spencer, “Professional Private Prosecutors and Trouble on the Trains” [2018] Archbold Review 5. 
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companies”.152 It appears that the figures for such cases may be very high: 277 prosecutions 
for fare evasion or failing to hold a valid ticket were brought in 2013 and 2014 at Cardiff 
Magistrates’ Court alone, leading to 185 convictions; this figure excludes penalty fares.153 
Despite a new appeal system being introduced under the Railways (Penalty Fares) Regulations 
2018/366, there is still a serious risk of inappropriate actual or threatened private prosecution, 
since the reforms relate only to penalty fares154; the consultation155 which led to the reforms 
noted inconsistencies in use of criminal and civil law between different train companies, with 
responders raising serious concerns about prosecutions, but since these issues were outside the 
scope of consultation, there was no response to them. 
 
On the basis of the above analysis, our view is that there are compelling arguments against 
leaving private prosecution in its current form in England and Wales. These potential 
inadequacies and/or biases of private prosecutions justify either their abolition or a safety-net, 
and, as we shall show, existing mechanisms fail to provide sufficient protection against such 
inadequacies and biases. 
 
 Existing mechanisms for controlling private prosecutions  
                                                            
152 Spencer, “Professional Private Prosecutors and Trouble on the Trains” [2018] Archbold Review 5, citing Pas-
senger Focus, “Ticket to ride? Full report” (May 2012), https://www.transportfocus.org.uk/research-publica-
tions/publications/ticket-to-ride-full-report-may-2012/ [Accessed 10 June 2019], and “Ticket to ride - an update” 
(February 2015), https://www.transportfocus.org.uk/research-publications/publications/ticket-to-ride-an-update/ 
[Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
153  T. Houghton, “Nearly 200 Rail Fair Dodgers Convicted in Cardiff in the Last Two Years”, 
https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/nearly-200-rail-fare-dodgers-9961224 [Accessed 10 June 
2019]. 
154 Save for the fact that reg.11 prevents a penalty fare being charged when a person is also being prosecuted under 
the byelaw offences; this is unlikely to be of much comfort in the circumstances. 
155 Department for Transport, Summary of Responses and Government Response to The Consultation on Changes 
to the Rail Penalty Appeals (London: TSO, 2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/575787/rail-penalty-fares-summary-and-government-responses.pdf 
[Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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The tort of malicious prosecution provides only partial protection against the potential 
inadequacies and/or biases of private prosecutions. Given the nature of the harm in some 
malicious prosecution cases, it may be impossible for money to genuinely “put the party who 
has suffered in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong”.156 
Indeed, an unsuccessful private prosecutor may not have the resources to provide 
compensation. Moreover, a person will only be liable for malicious prosecution if he pursues 
a claim without foundation and with a dominant purpose other than success in the claim.157 
Thus, a private prosecutor could never be liable for successfully prosecuting a person for an 
antiquated offence even if the purpose of the prosecution were something other than its 
professed purpose, such as to take revenge against an ex-spouse or irritating neighbour for 
personal reasons. Similar points can be made about the power to recover costs incurred in 
defending inappropriate private prosecutions.158 “A private prosecutor will not be liable for 
costs merely because the prosecution fails or is withdrawn, still less because it is a private 
prosecution”.159  
 
There are currently three main mechanisms for preventing the abuse of the right to bring a 
private prosecution.160  
 
Magistrates’ discretion 
                                                            
156 The purpose of an award of compensation in tort, as outlined in Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area 
Health Authority [1980] A.C. 174 at 187; [1979] 3 W.L.R. 44, per Lord Scarman. 
157 Crawford Adjusters v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] UKPC 17; [2014] A.C. 366 at [101], 
per Lord Kerr. 
158 Furthermore, it must be noted that such costs awards do not aim to compensate for emotional suffering. 
159 R. (on the application of Haig), v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2017] EWHC 232 (Admin); [2017] 
1 Costs L.R. 175 at [37]. In R. (on the application of Aisling Hubert) v Manchester Crown Court v Dr Prabha 
Sivaraman [2015] EWHC 3734, Burnett LJ held that “ordinarily a prosecutor should expect to have to bear the 
costs of a defendant in criminal proceedings where, on proper analysis, the prosecution never had any prospect of 
success and thus should never have been brought” (at [27]). 
160 For a complete list, see Law Commission, Consents to Prosecution (London: TSO, 1998), LC 255, para.2.14. 
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First, magistrates have the discretion to refuse to issue a summons or a warrant. A private 
prosecution is commenced by “laying an information” at a magistrate’s court. 161  An 
information is an allegation of a criminal offence. As Sally Almandras puts it,  
 
“Once an information has been laid, the magistrate will consider it and decide first whether to 
‘grant process’ (i.e. to proceed with the case) and second whether to issue a summons or a 
warrant”.162  
 
When deciding whether to issue a summons, the magistrate must ascertain  
 
“whether the allegation is an offence known to the law, and if so whether the essential 
ingredients of the offence are prima facie present; that the offence alleged is not time-barred; 
that the court has jurisdiction; and whether the informant has the necessary authority to 
prosecute.” 163 
 
If these requirements are met, the magistrate should issue the summons,  
 
“unless there are compelling reasons not to do so—most obviously that the application is 
vexatious (which may involve the presence of an improper ulterior purpose and/or long delay); 
                                                            
161 Part 7 of the Criminal Procedure Rules governs the form and content of the information; for example, by 
stipulating that it must contain a statement identifying the offence in question. 
162 S. Almandras, Private Prosecutions (SN/HA/5281), p.4. 
163 R. (on the application of Kay) v Leeds Magistrate Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin) at [22]; [2018] Crim. 
L.R. 855 summarising the previous case law. For a recent, high-profile case of a magistrate refusing to issue a 
summons on the grounds that the allegation was not of an offence known to English law, see R. (on the application 
of Al Rabbat) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2017] EWHC 1969 (Admin); [2018] 1 W.L.R. 2009, involving 
an attempted prosecution against Tony Blair, the former Prime Minister. 
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or is an abuse of process; or is otherwise improper”.164  
 
Like public prosecutors, advocates and solicitors handling private prosecutions owe a duty to 
the court to ensure that the proceedings are fair,165 which includes a duty to provide all relevant 
material to the court and the defence. There is a duty of candour that applies to an ex parte 
application for the issue of summonses, which may be described as one of “full and frank 
disclosure” including a duty “not to mislead the judge in any material way”.166 This also 
requires disclosure to the court of “any potentially adverse material” which may otherwise be 
relevant to the judge’s decision. 
 
In this context, it is also worth noting that unrepresented private prosecutors must make a 
statement that the allegations are “substantially true”, 167 that “the evidence on which the 
applicant relies will be available at trial”, 168  and that “the application discloses all the 
information that is material to what the court must decide”.169 However, crucially “[t]here is 
no obligation on the magistrate to make inquiries” in determining whether to issue a summons, 
although “he may do so if he thinks it necessary”.170 Furthermore, while a magistrate has the 
power to seek information from a proposed defendant, the latter has no right to be heard,171 
                                                            
164 R. (on the application of Kay) v Leeds Magistrate Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin) at [22]; [2018] Crim. 
L.R. 855. 
165 R. (on the application of Kay) v Leeds Magistrate Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin) at [22]; [2018] Crim. 
L.R. 855. 
166 R. (on the application of Kay) v Leeds Magistrate Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin) at [25]; [2018] Crim. 
L.R. 855.  
167 The Criminal Procedure Rules (as amended April 2018, r.7.2(5) and (6)). 
168 The Criminal Procedure Rules (as amended April 2018, r.7.2(5) and (6)). 
169 The Criminal Procedure Rules (as amended April 2018, r.7.2(5) and (6)). 
170 R (on the application of Kay) v Leeds Magistrate Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin) at [22]; [2018] Crim. 
L.R. 855. 
171 R (on the application of Kay) v Leeds Magistrate Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin) at [22]; [2018] Crim. 
L.R. 855. 
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which raises an issue of inequality of arms. In the vast majority of cases,172 magistrates simply 
consider the material provided by the informant. Thus, they are rarely in a position to be able 
to determine whether an allegation is vexatious or otherwise improper. This means that there 
is no effective filtering process to eliminate inappropriate prosecutions: obtaining a summons 
or a warrant from a magistrate is in effect largely just a matter of completing the paperwork 
correctly, notwithstanding the fact that “[a] misconceived private prosecution can cause great 
distress to the defendant, even when it is dismissed”.173 It must be remembered here that private 
prosecutions do not have to satisfy the Code for Crown Prosecutors.174 As the High Court put 
it in 2006,  
 
“[t]he criterion to be adopted by the justices for deciding whether to issue a summons for a 
private prosecution is much less onerous than the test which has to be applied by the Crown 
Prosecution Service in deciding whether to bring or to continue a prosecution.” 175 
 
As will be seen, we submit that compliance with the same standards as the CPS should be an 
important element of a new Code for Private Prosecutions if the power to initiate a private 
prosecution is to continue. In our view, this Code must be binding, with sanctions, and not 
merely good practice self-regulation by interested parties. 
 
Consent 
                                                            
172 West London Justices, ex parte Klahn [1979] 1 W.L.R. 933 at 936; [1979] Crim. L.R. 393. 
173  G. Cross, former Director of Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong, “Private Prosecutions”, 
http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/archive/pdf/art1001e.pdf [Accessed 10 June 2019]. This is a point to which we shall 
return below. 
174 S. Almandras, Private Prosecutions (SN/HA/5281), p.4. 
175 R. (on the application of Charlson) v Guilford Magistrates’ Court [2006] EWHC 2318; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 3494 
at [17]. 
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The second main procedural mechanism designed to prevent inappropriate private prosecutions 
is the requirement to obtain consent from the Attorney General or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions before instituting proceedings for certain offences. Dozens of offences require 
such consent, 176 but the vast majority do not (there are thousands of offences in English 
criminal law). As Lord Neuberger put it in Gujra, the right to “initiate private prosecutions … 
[is] virtually unlimited”. 177  Thus, this second procedural requirement acts as a control 
mechanism in only a small minority of situations. 
 
CPS power 
The third protection against inappropriate private prosecution is the CPS power to take them 
over. When the CPS exercises its power to take over a private prosecution, it can decide either 
to continue or discontinue the prosecution. In principle, this means that the CPS can take over 
and halt a private prosecution where it does not have a “realistic prospect” of resulting in a 
conviction or where the prosecution does not meet the public interest stage of the CPS test. 
According to the Code for Crown Prosecutors, where there is a realistic prospect of a 
prosecution resulting in a conviction, it should proceed “unless the prosecutor is satisfied that 
there are public interest factors tending against prosecution which outweigh those tending in 
favour.”178 In suitable cases, the public interest can be properly served by an out-of-court 
disposal rather than prosecution.179 The Code for Crown Prosecutors contains examples of 
factors relevant to determining whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. This CPS 
                                                            
176  See the list in Annex 1 of CPS, “Consents to Prosecute”, at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/con-
sent_to_prosecute/#a01 [Accessed 10 June 2019]. The CPS explain the rationale behind this requirement and 
outline the relevant statutory provisions. There are some other offences that require consent from other authorities: 
see Law Commission, Consents to Prosecution (London: TSO, 1998), LC 255, para.1.16. 
177 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [60]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
178 CPS, The Code for Crown Prosecutors, 8th edn (2018), para.4.10.1. 
179 CPS, The Code for Crown Prosecutors, 8th edn (2018), para.4.10.1. 
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power to take over and discontinue private prosecutions exists to protect individuals and their 
families from inappropriate prosecutions, as well as to prevent waste of the limited resources 
of the criminal justice system.180 It could be objected here that a criminal trial would not be 
inappropriate simply because it would be unlikely to result in a conviction, since “juries may 
… be unreasonable and prejudiced”181; for example, in the context of so-called “date rape” 
allegations. While this would be a valid point, it would nevertheless be true to say that the 
power of the CPS to take over and discontinue private prosecutions exists to limit the 
irreparable harm caused by inappropriate prosecutions, however one defines the term 
“inappropriate”. 
 
There are two reasons why this CPS power to discontinue prosecutions is of limited relevance 
in this context. First, there is no requirement for a private prosecutor or a magistrates’ court to 
notify the CPS of the initiation of a private prosecution182 and the reality is that the vast 
majority of private prosecutions never come to the attention of the CPS. Second, the CPS power 
to take over and discontinue prosecutions does not prevent the initiation of private prosecutions 
and the events which may precede them. Thus, it only partially protects the defendant from 
mental anguish, damaged reputation, career disruption and financial costs,183 whether or not 
that prosecution continues to trial, as has been underlined by the de Freitas case cited above. 
There is no statistical information about the length of time it normally takes for a defendant to 
a private prosecution to discover whether the CPS will discontinue it.184 The published CPS 
                                                            
180  See Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP), Report (London: HMSO, 1981), Cmnd. 8092, 
para.9.1. 
181 Lady Hale, R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [129]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
182 See Law Commission, Consents to Prosecution (London: TSO, 1998), LC 255, para.7.2–7.3. 
183 Law Commission, Consents to Prosecution (London: TSO, 1997), CP 149, para.1.9. 
184 According to the CPS, it “does not maintain a central record of private prosecutions referred to it” (CPS, 20 
October 2017, reply to a Freedom of Information Act 2000 request, https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/re-
quest/satistics_on_private_prosecution [Accessed 10 June 2019]). 
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private prosecution policy does not stipulate a deadline for the making of the decision.185 The 
CPS took over two months to reach a decision in Gujra,186 nearly two months in a 2015 case 
involving the prosecution of two doctors,187 and seven months in relation to a 1998 private 
prosecution concerning the Hillsborough stadium disaster.188 Even if it typically responds with 
greater speed than this, it is evident that a significant amount of harm can be caused in the 
meantime. Unjustified accusations of criminal wrongdoing can cause anxiety, panic attacks, 
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and high blood pressure even if they do not result in 
conviction. 189  Whilst the impact of such accusations may remain even after any legal 
proceedings are discontinued, research suggests that a protracted delay before discovery that 
there will be no further action can cause greater worry and therefore greater harm.190  
 
 Conclusions and a reform proposal: the middle ground  
The Law Commission recommended limited reform when reviewing the need for consents to 
private prosecution. Their key proposals were that the DPP should have the power to license 
bodies to bring private prosecutions without notification, 191  but that the CPS should be 
automatically notified of all other private prosecutions. 192  We agree with the underlying 
sentiment of the Law Commission here, but would go much further with our proposals. One 
                                                            
185 CPS, “Private Prosecutions”, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions/ [Accessed 10 June 
2019]. 
186 See R. (on the application of Gujra) v CPS [2011] EWHC 472 at [3]–[4]; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 254. 
187 See R. (on the application of Hubert) v Manchester Crown Court [2015] EWHC 3734 (Admin). 
188 Adlington v Duckenfield and Murray, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judg-
ments/duckenfield-and-murray-ruling.pdf [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
189 See e.g. Carolyn Hoyle, Naomi-Ellen Speechley and Ros Burnett, The Impact of Being Wrongly Accused of 
Abuse in Occupations of Trust: Victims’ Voices (Oxford: Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, 2016), 
pp.35–39. 
190 Hoyle, Speechley and Burnett, The Impact of Being Wrongly Accused of Abuse in Occupations of Trust: Vic-
tims’ Voices (Oxford: Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, 2016), p.40. 
191 Since notification would not be necessary where the body bringing the prosecution applies tests similar to those 
which the CPS would apply. 
192 Law Commission, Consents to Prosecution (London: TSO, 1998), LC 255, para.1.28. 
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possibility for reform is to completely abolish private prosecutions on the basis that the 
disadvantages outweigh the advantages of their existence. We are attracted to this option as a 
matter of principle, but do not believe that the political will currently exists for such a radical 
reform. The Government has shown no interest in abolishing private prosecution.193  
 
At the other extreme, there is the possibility of leaving the legal system unchanged in this area. 
We do not believe that this is appropriate either because there are limited controls on the right 
to initiate a private prosecution and this right can be exercised in a way that is seriously 
inappropriate; further, as examined above, theory struggles to find a basis to support the current 
position. 
 
We propose a middle ground involving the introduction of a statutory Code relating to private 
prosecutions, regulating all aspects of preparation, and involvement in, such prosecutions. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to provide all of the details of such a Code.194 However, we 
submit here that this Code should at a minimum introduce the following significant legal 
changes and principles. 
 
Filters 
First, in relation to unlicensed private prosecutors,195 we agree with Findlay Stark and the Law 
Commission that the CPS should be notified whenever a private prosecution is initiated.196 
                                                            
193 This might be because such a move would not only be unpopular but also undermine public faith in the criminal 
justice system. Significantly, the Crime Survey for England and Wales indicates that currently only 62 per cent 
of adults are “very” or “fairly” confident in the CPS (Office for National Statistics, “Confidence in the Crown 
Prosecution Service by Selected Personal Characteristics, year ending March 2018 CSEW” (2018)). 
194 We intend to provide these details in a subsequent publication. 
195 We will propose a licensing system for corporate and charitable prosecutions in a forthcoming article. 
196 F. Stark, “The Demise of the Private Prosecution?” [2013] Cambridge Law Journal 7, 9, referring to Law 
Commission, Consents to Prosecution (London: TSO, 1998), LC 255, paras 7.2–7.9. 
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This would help the CPS to use their power to take and over and discontinue prosecutions 
effectively and further, in the twenty-first century, could be a fully automated part of the court 
procedures with minimal costs or administrative burden. Indeed, we think that reform should 
go further in this respect and that there should be an initial hearing, where unlicensed private 
prosecutors are concerned, as a filtering mechanism. At one point in English legal history, the 
grand jury performed such a role and arguably served “a useful purpose in stopping unjustified 
prosecutions before trial”. 197  The grand jury system was abolished in England by the 
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933. Whilst this abolition may have 
been appropriate, there is a need for greater controls on the ability to initiate a private 
prosecution, given the potential for such a right to be abused. One way that such abuse could 
be limited is by the introduction of a pre-trial review by a magistrates’ court. Magistrates are 
currently rarely in a position to be able to determine whether an allegation is vexatious or 
otherwise improper. The criminal justice system could be improved by requiring a private 
individual to refer their intention to commence a private prosecution to a relevant Crown 
prosecutor, who would then apply the three-way decision process which we describe below. If 
the result of that process were that the CPS decided not to bring a public prosecution on the 
grounds that there was not a “realistic prospect” of a prosecution resulting in a conviction or 
that such a prosecution would not be in the public interest, then a would-be private prosecutor 
could use the VRR scheme, where applicable, and/or make an application to a magistrates’ 
court. The Crown prosecutor would be required to attend a pre-trial review to explain the 
decision not to prosecute. Leave to proceed with a private prosecution would be granted by the 
court only if there was a “realistic prospect” (as this terminology is explained below) of the 
                                                            
197 N. Elliff, “Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury” (1938) 29 Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology 3. 
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prosecution resulting in a conviction and the court was satisfied that a prosecution of D would 
be in the “public interest” as this term is defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors.198 
Prosecutions should not be brought where they would not be in the public interest. This is a 
reason why Vickerman should not have been prosecuted. As the CPS reportedly put it in a 
letter explaining why it chose not to prosecute him:  
 
“His ‘crime’ is to make it easier for others to find what is already there [on the internet]. This 
begs the rather obvious question of why he is being pursued rather than those who actually 
breach the copyright by displaying the material.”199  
 
Such a proposed review could strengthen oversight of prosecutorial discretion, allowing for the 
instigation of private prosecutions in appropriate cases. It would add to the VRR, which grants 
victims the right to review CPS decisions but which “is not as wide as it might be”.200 The 
VRR scheme only allows “victims” to review CPS decisions, a “victim” being defined as “a 
person who has made an allegation that they have suffered harm, including physical, mental or 
emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by criminal conduct”.201 Thus, 
organisations such as FACT or the RSPCA cannot use this scheme, since they do make such 
allegations; nor can the “vigilante” paedophile-hunters. Similarly, the VRR scheme does not 
apply where the police have not formally requested that the CPS make a decision to charge or 
                                                            
198 In other words, the private prosecutor would be obliged to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, 
notwithstanding any decision of the CPS not to prosecute, it was possible that D had committed the crime and 
that D’s prosecution would be in the public interest. 
199 CPS prosecutor, quoted by T. Lee, “Private justice: How Hollywood money put a Brit behind bars”, https://ar-
stechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/private-justice-how-hollywood-money-put-a-brit-behind-bars/2 [Accessed 
10 June 2019]. 
200 Rogers, “A Human Rights Perspective on the Evidential Test for Bringing Prosecutions” [2017] Crim. L.R. 
678, 693. 
201 CPS, Victims’ Right to Review Guidance (2016), p.5. 
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where a victim’s evidence has been considered by a Crown Prosecutor, who has decided to 
bring some charges but not for every allegation or against every suspect.202  
 
Statutory duty 
Leading on from this, we submit that the CPS duty in relation to private prosecutions should 
be fixed by statute in a clear, specific manner, and should apply both at the initial filter stage 
and throughout any subsequent proceedings which began as an attempted private prosecution. 
One problem here is that the CPS power to take over private prosecutions is largely unfettered 
as long as it does not “defeat or frustrate the policy of the Act from which it is derived”.203 
Although the CPS is bound by published policies, it is clear from Gujra that such policies can 
be changed at any time.204 Our view is that a would-be private prosecutor should be required 
to refer their intention to commence a private prosecution to a relevant Crown prosecutor. On 
notification of such an intention, a three-way decision-making process would occur between 
proceeding with it as a public prosecution, disallowing it or allowing it to proceed as a private 
prosecution with monitoring and review. There would be a duty to give reasons attached to this 
decision-making process. We submit in particular that the CPS should have a statutory duty to 
take over and discontinue a private prosecution at any point where it does not have a “realistic 
prospect” of resulting in a conviction or where the prosecution would not be in the public 
interest as the public interest is currently defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, including, 
for example, where the offence alleged is archaic or, has fallen into disuse. Trials should not 
                                                            
202 CPS, Victims’ Right to Review Guidance (2016), p.4. It appears that the CPS has a discretion, but not a duty, 
to review cases that fall outside of the VRR scheme (see R. (on the application of Chaudry) v DPP [2016] EWHC 
2447 at [46]; [2017] Crim. L.R. 231 and CPS, Victims’ Right to Review Guidance (2016), p.4). 
203 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [76], per Lord Kerr; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
204 See K. Amirthalingam, “Private prosecutions and the public prosecutor’s discretion” [2013] Law Quarterly 
Review 325, 328. For the current CPS policies, see CPS, “Private Prosecutions”, http://www.cps.gov.uk/le-
gal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions/ [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
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begin or continue where they do not have a “realistic prospect” of resulting in a conviction or 
where the prosecution does not meet the public interest stage of the Code. As Lord Wilson put 
it in Gujra:  
 
“A defendant would have a legitimate grievance about subjection to criminal prosecution at 
the instance of a private prosecutor in circumstances in which, by application of lawful criteria 
to the strength of the evidence against him, there would be no public prosecution”,205  
 
 and indeed, it is difficult to justify the public purse refunding costs in such cases; hence all 
prosecutions should, so far as is reasonably possible, be subject to the same safeguards.  
 
Our proposals would not eliminate private prosecutions but allow them to continue where there 
is a “realistic prospect” of them resulting in a conviction and they would be in the public 
interest. It could be argued that it would “be preferable to make the CPS responsible for 
prosecuting [such] cases”206 because there is no good reason why “the pursuit of these cases 
should depend on the action of private prosecutors”.207 However, in response to this, it can be 
counter-argued that it is important to allow such private prosecutions to proceed “[i]n the 
absence of a particular need for CPS involvement”208; for example, where a court granted leave 
to proceed with a private prosecution and the private prosecutor understandably has no 
confidence in the CPS because of its earlier conduct or where the private prosecutor has 
technical knowledge and/or skill lacked by public prosecutors and is for this reason best placed 
                                                            
205 R. (on the application of Gujra) (FC) v CPS [2012] UKSC 52 at [36]; [2013] Crim. L.R. 337. 
206 Stark, “The Demise of the Private Prosecution?” [2013] Cambridge Law Journal 10. 
207 Stark, “The Demise of the Private Prosecution?” [2013] Cambridge Law Journal 10. 
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to prosecute. Before proceeding to our next reform proposal, we submit that, in determining 
whether a trial has a “realistic prospect” of resulting in a conviction, the CPS and a court 
conducting a pre-trial review should pay appropriate attention to what ought reasonably to 
happen and determine that a trial has a “realistic prospect” of conviction where  
 
“an objective, impartial and reasonable jury, or bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case 
alone, properly directed and acting in accordance with the law, is more likely than not to 
convict the defendant of the charge alleged”.209  
 
Such an interpretation of the term “realistic prospect” is important because “in certain areas 
actual statistics regarding convictions may not be a reliable guide to what ought reasonably to 
happen”.210  
 
Sanctions 
Another reform which we believe is essential is that there should be clear sanctions where a 
defendant has been subjected to a malicious private prosecution or to behaviour by a private 
prosecutor or their agents which breaches the normal requirements of the laws of criminal 
procedure and evidence, including our proposed statutory Code. Such protection would be 
important even if our earlier proposals were implemented; for example, because a private 
prosecution might proceed to trial based on fabricated evidence which was exposed during the 
trial process itself or by other means. Protection of suspects’ rights should not vary depending 
upon the identity and nature of the prosecutor. It is currently possible to obtain exemplary 
                                                            
209 CPS, The Code for Crown Prosecutors, 8th edn (2018), para.4.7. 
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damages for malicious public prosecutions, since they constitute “oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional action by the servants of the government”.211 However, it is debatable whether 
a private prosecutor is a “servant of the government” for this purpose. In Rookes v Barnard, 
Lord Devlin suggested that he would not extend this head of exemplary damages to include 
“oppressive action by private corporations or individuals”212 because private corporations or 
individuals are not “servants of the people”213 whose use of power “must always be subordinate 
to their duty of service”.214 On the other hand, subsequent cases have suggested that “‘servants 
of the government’ should be broadly, not technically, construed”.215 For instance, in Cassell 
& Co v Broome, Lord Hailsham LC stated: 
  
“I am not prepared to say without further consideration that a private individual misusing legal 
powers of private prosecution or arrest … might not at some future date be assimilated into the 
first category”.216  
 
The law needs settling here. It should be possible to obtain exemplary damages for malicious 
private prosecution, since the potential for such damages could help to protect us from the 
potential inadequacies and/or biases of private prosecutions. What is important here is not the 
nature of the prosecutor but the need to protect individuals from the abuse of power. 
 
Claire de Than 
Professor and Director of Studies, Institute of Law Jersey; Jersey Law Commissioner 
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